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For Prize or Patriotism: The Understood Role of Privateers in
the American Revolution
Jay Feyerabend

In early June 1775, three ships, the Margaretta, Unity, and
Polly sailed up the muddy waters of the Machias River toward the
small, isolated town of Machias in present-day Maine. The Bostonbased vessels Unity and Polly frequently traded lumber with
colonists in Machias. This time, however, the British warship
Margaretta accompanied the two schooners to protect the ships
from the colonists, who presumably had received the news of the
recent tension in Boston. The three ships laid anchor at Machias’
wharf to trade provisions such as “salt, pork and flour” with the
residents of Machias in exchange for lumber, the industry that drove
economic life in Machias. 1 Increasingly disdainful of the British, the
colonists were increasingly less inclined to provide the British with
lumber because, as many of the colonists correctly thought, the
British army would use lumber to build barracks for the army’s siege
of Boston. After days of tense negotiations with Ichabod Jones, the
Tory owner of the Polly and Unity, the colonial representatives and
British officials agreed to a trade deal. This development angered
the more fervently patriotic residents of Machias who perceived this
trade agreement to be coercive and unfair. Ultimately, the colonists’
anti-British sentiments prevailed when an angry mob of
approximately thirty men stormed a church in which Jones and the
British officer Captain Moore were present.
After narrowly escaping from the mob of colonists, Jones
retreated into the Maine woods. British sailors rescued Captain
Moore and took him aboard the war ship Margaretta. Once on the
Margaretta, Moore threatened to burn the town if the colonists kept
Jones from making the trade. Unimpressed with the firepower of the
Margaretta, the colonists rejected the order and stormed the Unity
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and Polly. Led by prominent lumberjack Jerimiah O’Brien, the
colonists quickly gained control of the Unity and fired on the
Margaretta. After exchanges of pistol and musket fire, the
Margaretta pulled up its anchor and retreated up river. After
anchoring up river for the night, Captain Moore realized he had
failed to protect the trade interests of Ichabod Jones, who was still
hiding in the woods. Moore decided to forego the mission and sail
back toward Machias Bay. Jerimiah O’Brien and the colonists,
however, had other ideas. As the Margaretta tried to escape toward
the sea, the Unity rammed into the Margaretta, then the colonists
swiftly stormed the ship’s deck. After intense close-range, hand-tohand combat, the outnumbered British finally submitted and the
colonists captured the Margaretta and returned to Machias “in great
triumph, with their colors flying.” 2 Incidents such as the one at
Machias, according to one historian, preceded a complex and
multifaceted naval conflict during the American Revolution. 3 The
patriotic spirit of men like Jerimiah O’Brien and the “Machias Sons
of Liberty” suggests that regardless of their position, these men
deliberately chose to fight for independence.
The “Machias Sons of Liberty” anecdote aligns with the
standard historical narrative about colonial rebellion against British
tyranny. At the conclusion of the French and Indian War, Great
Britain implemented a series of taxes, which colonists deemed
unfair and oppressive in light of the Enlightenment. 4 On the
contrary, the British viewed these taxes as just and necessary means
of protecting colonists and their interests (both on land and sea). In
response to British taxation, colonists made a conscious choice
either to split from the crown, or to remain British subjects.
Privateers fought in the war for complex, nuanced reasons.
This paper starts from the assumption that privateers were
influential in the naval theater of the war, one on which historians
have reached a consensus. Using both the Official Naval Documents
from the American Revolution and firsthand accounts from sailors,
this essay will explore the financial aspects of privateering and
examine the political sentiments of sailors. The paper will examine
the various perceptions of the role of privateers, and how those
perceptions differed among politicians in the Continental Congress,
military officials, and the privateers themselves. Contemporaries
believed that monetary gain rather than patriotism more likely
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss1/3
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motivated the privateers. Although contemporaries likely would
have believed that privateers were patriots and privateers had
secondary motivations to join the war, the privateers’ motivations
were mostly of financial self-interest. Finally, the paper will assess
the general effectiveness of privateers (as understood by their
contemporaries) versus the effectiveness of the Continental Navy,
drawing a clearer picture of the role privateers played during the
American Revolution. The Continental Congress regarded the
privateers as a valuable tool in their arsenal in fighting the British
navy, and the privateers’ involvement was a significant
consideration in Congress’ calculation and execution of strategies
for effectively waging war against Great Britain.
Historians generally have reached a consensus on the
influence of privateering on the American war effort, but they
continue to debate whether patriotism or monetary gain motivated
the privateers. Historical debate on the importance of privateering
in the American Revolution began with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. Referencing
George Washington’s dependence on the French Navy, Mahan
argues that the commissioned navies were far more significant to the
maritime war than the privateers. In response to Mahan, Edgar
Stanton Maclay asserts that privateering was in fact an important,
even “dominating,” and legitimate form of naval warfare because
privateering influenced the circulation of important supplies. 5 In
further support of Maclay’s argument, Reuben Stivers emphasizes
the privateers’ patriotism through his portrayal of them as a
“Volunteer Navy,” while in contrast, Carl Swanson argues that a
desire for money primarily—perhaps singularly—motivated men to
become privateers. According to Swanson, there is minimal
evidence to suggest that patriotic resistance to British tyranny
motivated privateers.6
Economic Allure of Privateering
Patriotic fervor and disdain for coercive British policies, as
in the case of “The Machias Sons of Liberty,” first inspired some
men to take up arms against the powerful Royal Navy. Patriotic
sentiments, however, probably did not convince all colonists to
continue waging war against the British. For both privateers and the
Published
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Continental Navy, the financial appeal of the war influenced sailors’
decisions about joining the war. As it became increasingly evident
that America’s struggle for independence would require a prolonged
war against the British, a major concern for men (and their families)
determined to contribute to the war effort centered on how
individuals would be financially compensated for their efforts while
away from their homes—often for extended periods of time.
Agreeing to fight against British rule was more than a patriotic
decision, as this commitment influenced a sailors’ ability to earn a
living from his pre-war occupation. Men who wanted to become
sailors during the late 1770s faced two primary options: either join
the newly formed Continental Navy or join a privateering vessel
commissioned by the Continental Congress or more commonly by
state governments.
While the salary promised to the sailors by the Continental
Congress was a reliable source of income, the potential to make
great deals of money through privateering was a much more
attractive prospect to many. Sailors in the Continental Navy
typically received a salary of five dollars, and officers and seamen
split one third of the prizes from ships they seized. 7 As historian
James Volo explains, “in most cases simple economic self-interest
spurred these patriots to serve by the hundreds in private warships
from 1775 to 1783. So popular was privateering that the regular
navy had trouble recruiting and keeping crews.”8 This
overwhelming trend toward privateering suggests financial motives
strongly outweighed the desire to fight with the continental forces.
Sailor Jacob Nagle’s writings support this claim. In his journal,
Nagle claimed to have taken in nine prizes in May and June 1780
while sailing on the Fair American and twenty-one prizes while on
the Rising Son from July 1781 through October 1781. Though Nagle
did not state the specific amount in his journal, historian John Dann
surmises that Nagle earned hundreds of British pounds as a
privateer. Since American privateers were capturing many ships,
Nagle certainly was not the only sailor making large sums of money.
Many colonists who observed the money-making potential of
privateering—but were not capable of joining crews—became
involved by investing in the financial support of a vessel.
Letters and other historical documents during this period
provide some insight into the amount of bounty that privateers
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss1/3
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seized. Dr. James Warren wrote to John Adams in August 1776 to
inform him of the amount of goods taken as prizes by privateers—
goods that were ultimately sold in Boston during the summer of
1776: “We have nothing going forward here but fixing out
privateers, and condemnation and sale of prizes sent in by them, so
many that I am quite lost in my estimate of them, and West India
goods are falling at a great rate. Yesterday arrived a prize taken by
at [New] York Privateers with several hundred bags of cotton.”
Warren’s tone suggests that privateering was a constant source of
income, which was not particularly interesting to Adams. Not
mentioning the cost of “fixing out privateers” also suggests that the
cost of doing so was not very significant. 9
John Avery wrote to President John Hancock of the
Continental Congress explaining how Massachusetts is “intirely
exhausted of commissions Instructions and Bonds for Armed
vessels & call for them seems to increase therefore Should be greatly
obliged to you if you would forward a Number of them of them for
the Use of this State.”10 From this letter it can be inferred that
privateering was growing in popularity. Moreover, it was not just
Massachusetts that was exhausting its bonds and commission
instructions. The call for privateering apparently occurred
throughout many of the American colonies. One such example
involves North Carolina.
The state of North Carolina was especially liberal in its
policies regarding privateering; sailors were entitled to keep onehalf of goods taken from merchant ships. If a crew captured a British
vessel, then the crew split the bounty among themselves, minus a
fee.11 This incentive certainly would have enticed sailors living near
the North Carolina shores (and possessing a proclivity to support the
American cause) to join a privateering vessel and reap the rewards.
Privateers’ Political Sentiments
Whether sailors pursued an independent nation via their
involvement in privateering is a different question, as personal
motivations and sentiments may or may not have aligned within the
broader goals of earning Independence for the Colonies. Although
there is evidence for the pursuit of economic benefits, there is scarce
evidence of sailors’ political sentiments. As a result, it is difficult to
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say whether sailors regarded themselves as patriots or loyalists. It
must be remembered that colonists cannot be neatly segmented into
two distinct parties of patriots and loyalists. The case of Jacob Nagle
serves as an example.
Jacob Nagle served in the Continental Army and Navy and
on numerous vessels as a privateer. He thoroughly documented his
sentiments and beliefs in a journal. While the entries illuminate his
perspective on his role in the war, what they do not address is of
critical importance. He does not reflect on political theory or provide
updates on the land war, which he would have learned about during
his time on privateering vessels.
When violence erupted at Lexington and Concord in 1775,
the thirteen-year-old Nagle was traveling from his hometown of
Reading, Pennsylvania to the American Barracks outside
Philadelphia with his father, George Nagle. Jacob’s father accepted
a role in 1776 as major in the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment. His
father’s prominence in the military probably influenced how the
young Nagle viewed the war. Following his visit to Philadelphia,
Nagle returned to Reading for about a year until his father sent for
him and he joined the Army as a regular soldier. Nagle remained in
the Colonial Army until the summer of 1778. Little is known about
Nagle’s time between leaving the Army and joining the crew of the
Fair American, a privateering vessel. 12 However, it is believed that
Jacob Nagle might have spent roughly six weeks in the Continental
Navy serving on the Saratoga, where he likely received basic sailing
skills under the command of Captain Young prior to joining the Fair
American.13 At a time when the Continental Navy struggled to
recruit sailors, Captain Young’s willingness to allow Nagle leave for
a private vessel strongly suggests that naval commanders
understood the effectiveness of privateering and viewed privateers
as an integral part of the war effort while still realizing the fiscal
benefits of privateering.
Prior to his brief stint in the Continental Navy, Nagle
planned to sail for Europe before his parents forbade it. Nagle’s
desire to leave North America suggests that his service in the army
may have had more to do with his parents’ wishes than his own
political inclinations. Although Nagle sailed on various privateering
vessels, his journal curiously does not mention the war except when
he and other sailors from The Trumbull were traveling by land to
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss1/3
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Philadelphia and looking for quarters to spend the evening on their
journey. Nagle and the other sailors found “a farm housed about a
mile on the road, but he could not tell weather he would give us
entertainment or not, as he new he was a rank, but he told us not to
let on that we had seen him, as he would be there by dark, and if we
would be Tories for one night, he had no doubt but what we would
be well treated.”14 If privateers truly regarded themselves as
American patriots, one would expect Nagle mention the land war or
at least comment on other sailors’ conversations about it. By not
mentioning the land war in his journal, even after he served time in
the Continental Army, Nagle might not have thought the land war
was as significant as his work on various privateering vessels.
Privateers seemed to take more pride in their privateering
than in fighting for political freedom. For example, Hohn Manly, a
privateer operating out of Philadelphia, became a national hero for
his exploits as a privateer. When Manly entered a port, the local
newspaper regarded the event as newsworthy. In 1776, a ballad
titled “Manly: A Favourite New Song in the American Fleet” was
recorded. Some lines from the song include “Brave Manly his is
stout, and his men have proved true,” and “To Him and all those
valiant Souls who go in Privateers.” 15 It stands to reason that serving
on a privateering vessel excited those who were seeking this type of
adventure. Privateers and those related to privateering regarded the
profession as honorable. Further, it appears that privateering was not
perceived as piracy; neither the private journal of Jacob Nagle nor
any official documents from the continental or state legislatures
described privateering in the same manner as the illegal act of
piracy—an activity which was regarded with great disdain at the
time.
There were, however, other reasons why men might have
chosen to become privateers. During the late 1770s both state
militias and the Continental Army drafted soldiers to ensure there
were enough for the war effort. One way men could avoid
conscription was by volunteering to serve on a privateering vessel.
While the living standards on privateering vessels were not
desirable, it might have been well understood that life on a
privateering ship—and the spoils associated with it—would have
been preferable to serving in the army and living in the
encampments. This further supports the notion that men opted to
Published
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become privateers not due to patriotic support for independence, but
rather to avoid life in the army (coupled with the potential to earn
great rewards).
Privateers likely chose their profession for a myriad of
reasons. Whether to seek riches, avoid service in the American
army, or simply to pursue adventure, privateers held a variety of
motivations which were not strictly patriotic. Moreover, it is
reasonable to assume that men serving on privateering ships may
have regarded their service as simply a way to continue providing
for their families when they no longer could be regular sailors as
they were before the war. To these men, earning a living might have
been more important than serving a political cause.
Privateers’ Role in Congress’ Naval Strategy
The freedom-seeking politicians in Philadelphia understood
the popularity of privateering and likely seized on the opportunity
to leverage (non-political) privateers for the war effort. Nagle’s
experience as a privateer is likely representative of many of his
contemporaries’ time aboard ship. Whether driven by a desire to
serve their country or to earn money for their families, privateers
contributed to the American cause. This contribution is most evident
in Congress’ use of privateers to disrupt British supply lines and to
gather critical matériel for the American cause.
Without the financial means to lure sailors away from
profitable private ventures, the Continental Congress decided that
using privateers to wreak havoc on British vessels—rather than
building official Naval ships—was more financially viable. Because
building and maintaining a congressional navy was very expensive,
the size of the navy was small compared to the number of privateers
on the water. Estimates of the number of men in the Navy range
from six-hundred in 1775 to roughly four thousand around 1777,
with an average of under two thousand sailors per year between the
years of 1775 and 1782. 16 Although accurate records substantiating
the actual number of privateers during those years are difficult to
come by, many historians believe those numbers were in fact
significantly higher.
Congressional legislation empowered both the Continental
Congress and state congresses to grant Letters of Marque. These
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss1/3
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were permits for colonial vessels to engage in privateering activities
in exchange for two-thirds of the prize acquired by the vessel. 17 This
was a compelling proposition for colonial governments, as they
would not shoulder any of the financial burden of procuring ships
and preparing the vessels for their voyages. Wealthy individuals or
investment groups assumed the risks and costs of putting ships to
sea. Historians continue to speculate on the percentage of Letters of
Marque that the Continental Congress versus state legislatures
granted. Historian Sidney Morse, for example, claims that the
Continental Congress—rather than the state legislatures—actually
granted substantial number of Letters of Marques (or bonds). 18 State
legislatures nonetheless played a significant part. The Massachusetts
House of Representatives, for example, also staunchly supported
privateering; they documented as much by writing “permit as many
Persons, within their Limits, as they shall think proper, to fit out
Privateers and the sd Comee are also hereby directed to
commissionate such Officers as they shall judge suitable for the
above purpose.”19 The legislature placed no limits on the number of
ships receiving Letters of Marque. This decision indicates that
Massachusetts Representatives deemed privateering to be a
necessary practice.
Pennsylvania politicians seemed to come to a similar
conclusion. Understanding the financial motivations of privateers,
colonial legislators had to grapple with sailors switching sides and
joining the British for financial gain. The Pennsylvania Committee
of Safety stipulated the official punishment for treason on March 26,
1776 under the suspicion that “wicked and ill-disposed persons have
seduced and inticed some of the Men belonging to the Boats, to
desert the service and go into other employ.” The records then
continue, “[anyone] who shall harbour and Conceal any Deserter
(knowing him to be such) from the Continental Forces, or any other
Forces raised within this or any other of the United Colonies, for the
Defence of America, shall forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding
fifty nor less than thirty Dollars, or suffer three months
imprisonment.”20 In effect, Pennsylvania was “cracking down” on
privateers that showed no loyalty to the American cause.
Nevertheless, privateers were critical to the war effort.
Effectiveness of Privateers and the Continental Navy
Published
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Before the French government decided in 1778 to send a
fleet of twelve ships to support the American cause, privateers were
the colonies’ main naval defense against the British. Privateers
experienced overwhelming success in the early parts of the war. In
December 1775, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves of the Royal Navy
wrote to Major General William Howe, “I wish it was in my power
to give your Excellency more satisfaction on the Subject of your
Letter,” updating Howe on the effectiveness of the Royal Navy.
Graves continues, “It is impossible for the Ships to keep on their
stations or prevent the Rebels from making further captures.”21
Additionally, Graves informed Phillip Stephens that “the Rebels
watch the opportunity of the Kings Ships and Vessels being off the
Coast, slip out in light good going Vessels full of Men, seize a
defenceless Merchant ship and push immediately for the nearest
Port the Wind will carry them.” 22 Graves’ outline of a basic strategy
for privateers as early as 1775 serves as evidence that privateering
was common. Graves’ decision to write to his colleagues in England
about privateering further suggests that privateering significantly
challenged the British forces.
Privateers held many advantages over the formation and
maintenance of a standing navy. The lack of funding and the
relatively small number of vessels made organization of a
Continental squadron improbable. According to Volo, “Although
small squadrons of American Privateers sometimes acted in concert,
a lack of equipment and seamen for manning the more powerful
Continental frigates suggests that the hope of combing the
operations of their widely scattered warships was wildly ambitious.”
The Continental and State Navies did not have the leadership to
operate as a cohesive unit. Volo further describes the “largest
American Naval Operation” in 1779 as “an utmost disaster because
it lacked both experienced leadership and an appropriate operational
strategy.”23 It was for these reasons that politicians relied heavily on
privateers to establish a legitimate naval presence in the Atlantic
Ocean.
Privateering, however, was not an easy task—and was
certainly not without risk. Nevertheless, early privateers
experienced meaningful success during the early parts of the war;
this was largely due to the skill and experience of the captains,
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss1/3
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coupled with their familiarity of the coastal waters. Vice Admiral
Richard Lord Howe describes the risk in his letter of 1777 to Phillip
Stephens: “Several Privateers have been chased by different
Cuizers: But from the better sailing –State in which the former can
with facility kept, and other local Advantages, Without Effect.”24 In
many instances, captains of privateering vessels had been working
in the maritime industry for many years prior to the start of the
American Revolution and were very familiar with sailing in North
American waters. Privateers also commonly used vessels that were
lighter, faster and featured greater maneuverability as compared to
their British counterparts. 25 These factors were critical in terms of
engaging and outmaneuvering their opponents. During the early
periods of the American Revolution, these successes at sea were
some of the Americans’ only victories. Without the optimism the
privateers were providing for the rebel cause, General Washington
would have faced greater challenges in the war effort, especially in
the recruitment of men.
Although Congress did not regulate them, privateering ships
did create some problems. First, the reliability and loyalty of
Privateers was a constant cause for concern. As Jacob Nagle writes
in his journal, “[I] belonged to a passenger in the schooner and was
not in the bill of laden. That private property he smuggled and put
in his own pocket. Being ready, we took in a cargo of sugar and
coffee, and the rest in Spacia, and put to see.” 26 Nagle is explaining
the act of smuggling that was all too common among privateers.
Vessels like the one Nagle described would capture British goods
and sell them without making any governmental authorities aware
of the capture. If privateers smuggled cargo, then they would not
have to pay a percentage to the government as outlined in the Letter
of Marque. This willingness to break the law for fiscal gain shows
that the first motive of privateers was to make money, as opposed to
supporting the broader cause of winning the war.
The Continental Congress also struggled with treasonous
sailors such as John Goodrich, a wealthy merchant from
Portsmouth, Virginia. Goodrich and his son understood that
privateers could profit from the war regardless of which side they
supported. The Goodrich family was ultimately responsible for the
capture of over 100 American ships. Following the British retreat
from New York City, John Goodrich and his son sailed for England,
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where they received a pension for their efforts in disrupting
American commerce. Goodrich was not the only Englishman
involved in privateering; British privateers commonly captured
ships off the coast of Europe. This was explained by William
McCreery in an October 10, 1777 letter to John Adams: “The
Carolinians have been peculiarly unlucky of late in the vessels
which they Sent to Europe. Four out of five which got into the Bay
were taken, & I Saw a Letter from Cadiz yesterday.” 27
By 1777, the British were becoming more familiar with
American privateering tactics and made strategic adjustments. In
his December 4 letter to William Bingham, Robert Morris writes
how he believed British merchant ships had armed themselves: “to
counter this display force, he recommends a Stout Privateer because
I imagine the British ships will now come out very generally Armed
and little will be done to the small ones.” 28 Privateering was
becoming more difficult, expensive, and dangerous as British ships
began arming themselves in anticipation of engaging privateers.
This adjustment by the British likely had some impact on the
effectiveness of American privateering efforts and ultimately led to
a greater reliance on the French fleet as the war progressed.
Although privateers became less influential following France’s
intervention in the war, the significance of the practice during the
initial years of the war cannot be understated. Privateering provided
the American rebels with the necessary funds and supplies to sustain
the fight against the British.
Studying the privateers complicates the patriot-loyalist
narrative about the American Revolution. Critics of this claim might
argue that many participants in the American Revolution fought for
high-minded liberal principles. In one of the foremost scholarly
examples of this interpretation, historian Gordon S. Wood argues
that the Enlightenment writings of John Locke and Thomas Paine
ignited the animosity of the American colonists toward British
oppression, leading to the fight for independence from the British
Empire.29
In a more critical approach to the American Revolution, the
struggle for independence in colonial America was more parochial.
The war was fought by countless ordinary people whose names have
been lost to history. They lived their lives while embracing their
beliefs and values. The privateers exemplified these soldiers. They
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss1/3
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were foremost working professionals—sailors, as it were, similar to
other skilled tradesmen, merchants, or planters. And like those men
in other professions, their main goal during the 1770s was to provide
for their families while making a healthy living during a period of
intense political and economic uncertainty. This is not to suggest
that no privateer was sympathetic to the cause of American liberty.
But the historical evidence suggests quite a few of these men were
primarily seizing the opportunity to get rich, and it would have been
fortuitous that this endeavor aligned with their political leanings.
From a different vantage point on privateers, political elites
viewed the privateers as a tool in the fight against British tyranny,
and were making strategic decisions about fighting the war based on
the value of privateers. While the perceived nature of privateers adds
insight to the historical record, the political elites would not have
been concerned with how privateers saw themselves, and the
privateers would have been largely disinterested in how the political
class perceived them. The political elites would have grasped the
immense value of privateers, and likely worried (to some degree)
about the precedent of piracy being set in the waters off the
American coastline that might continue after the war. However, it
is reasonable to assert that the political class accepted this situation
and determined that post-war precedents regarding privateering
could be handled another day—that is, after the war had been won.
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